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Abstract
We present a search-and-matching model of the housing market where potential buyerswillingness
to pay is private information and sellers may become desperate as they are unable to sell. A unique
steady state equilibrium exists where desperate sellers o¤er sizeable price cuts and sell faster. If
the number of distressed sales rises then even relaxed sellers are forced to lower their prices.
Buyers, on the other hand, become more selective and search longer for better deals. The model
yields a theoretical density function of the time-to-sale, which is positively skewed and may be
hump-shaped. These results are consistent with recent empirical ndings.
Keywords: housing, private information, random search, motivated sellers
JEL: D39, D49, D83
1Cardi¤ Business School, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, Cardi¤, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 2920 870831.
E-Mail: selcukc@cardi¤.ac.uk
1 Introduction
Selling a house involves a long and non-trivial search process where the home seller faces
a trade-o¤ between the price and the time to sale. With su¢ cient time and no pressure
to sell immediately, a relaxedseller can a¤ord to wait to receive a price commensurate
with the market value. However, due to factors such as bankruptcy, . some sellers
become desperate(or motivatedin real estate parlance) and want to sell urgently.
To study how this transition a¤ects pricing and purchasing decisions of sellers and
buyers and the expected time to sale we build a search-and-matching model of the housing
market with two distinctive features. First, sellers may become desperate as they wait to
sell, and second, buyerswillingness to pay is private information.2
A quick description of the model is this (but see section 2). Sellers enter the market
in a relaxed state and advertise take-it-or-leave-it prices to sell their houses. However as
they are unable to sell they may be hit by an exogenous shock (e.g. job-loss, bankruptcy
etc.) and become more impatient or desperate to sell. Buyers arrive randomly and
upon inspecting house they realize their private valuation (willingness to pay) which is
unobservable to sellers. Hence, sellers advertise a single price for all potential buyers,
i.e., they cannot price-tailor to individual customers. Clearly a meeting may not result
in trade if the house is not appealing enough for the buyer. Buyerspurchasing decision
is simple. Only if their willingness to pay exceeds an endogenous threshold they buy,
otherwise they keep searching. This threshold rises with the list price; hence sellers face
a trade-o¤ between selling at a higher price vs. selling more quickly. The fraction of
desperate sellers is also endogenous and buyers can raise this fraction by being choosier,
i.e., by raising the aforementioned threshold.
What do we nd? First we prove existence of a unique steady state equilibrium if
the survival function associated with buyersvaluations is log-concave. The equilibrium is
characterized by a pair of list prices posted by relaxed and stressed sellers and threshold
2Search models are extensively used to study the housing market, e.g. see Wheaton (1990), Yavas and
Yang (1995), Krainer (2001), Ngai and Tenreyro (2009). Among others Albrecht et al. (2007) is closest
to our model in terms of motivation and setup; however they assume complete information.
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valuations for buyers associated with those prices. In equilibrium stressed sellers post
lower prices than relaxed sellers and consequently sell faster. Indeed, once hit by the
shock a seller starts to discount the future more heavily, hence o¤ers a price-cut to sell
more quickly.
More importantly, if the shock starts to arrive more often, due to, say, a nancial
crisis or recession where home sellers are more likely to lose their jobs or face other
nancial di¢ culties, then not only more sellers become desperate, but even relaxed sellers
lower their prices due to spill over e¤ects. Buyers, on the other hand, exhibit a vulture
behaviour: even though prices decrease, the rising fraction of desperate sellers induces
buyers to hold o¤ purchasing and search longer for better deals. For sellers this is indeed
a triple hit: more sellers become desperate, even regular sellers lower their prices, but it
is more di¢ cult to sell.
The model yields a theoretical density function of the time on the market, which is
positively skewed and may be hump-shaped. In particular the tail of the pdf slims down
and the average time on the market drops as the shock starts to arrive more frequently or
starts to become more severe. We also show that the expected sale price falls the longer
the house stays on the market.
These results are empirically plausible. Glower et al. (1998) document that motivated
sellers o¤er price discounts and sell faster. Campbell et al. (2009) nd that forced sales
have signicant spill over e¤ects on prices of unforced sales. Merlo et al. (2008) obtain
the density of time-to-sale which, similar to ours, is positively skewed and hump shaped.
Finally, Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) document that average sale price falls with the
duration.
To obtain analytically tractable results that could be compared with empirical ndings
in the literature we deliberately ignore bargaining in the price determination process.
Indeed bargaining models with private information often yield delays and have multiple
equilibria and therefore come with very limited predictive power.3 Similar concerns led
us to choose a memoryless arrival rate for the shock. A state dependent arrival rate is
3See, e.g., the survey by Kennan and Wilson (1993) and the references therein.
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more intuitive, however this, again, comes at the expense of tractability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework and discusses
buyersand sellersproblems. Section 3 discusses existence of steady state equilibrium
and presents comparative statics. Section 4 investigates the densities of time-to-sale and
prices. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Time is continuous and innite. The economy consists of a continuum of agents divided
into two identical sets: sellers and buyers, who meet each other at a constant Poisson rate
 > 0:4 Each seller has a unit of a homogenous good (a house) and each buyer seeks to
purchase one. The utility to the seller from keeping the house forever is zero, in other
words we assume away positive or negative ow values from owning or maintaining the
house. Buyers assign di¤erent values (willingness to pay) to di¤erent houses and they di¤er
from one another with respect to their valuations of a particular house. The suitability
of a match between a house and a buyer is specic to the pair. For example, a particular
house may match a buyers needs or taste perfectly well, while at the same time being an
unsatisfactory match to another buyer. Upon meeting a seller and inspecting the house,
the buyer realizes his own valuation of the house v 2 [0; 1], which is a random draw from
a distribution with cdf F (v). Comparing the realized v with the price, the buyer decides
whether or not to buy the house. We emphasize that buyers are identical in that their
valuations are generated by the same random process, however they may di¤er in their
valuations for any particular house which are independent draws from F ()5. We impose
log-concavity on the survival function, which is a crucial technical assumption for several
4What we have in mind is a Pissarides (2000) style random matching function where arrival rates are
functions of the buyer-seller ratio (market tightness). Typically one allows for di¤erent number of buyers
and sellers so that arrival rates for buyers and sellers di¤er. To avoid excessive parametrization we simply
assume equal number of buyers and sellers so that traders meet each other with the same rate .
5This assumption is adopted by Jovanovic (1979), Wolinsky (1988), Krainer and LeRoy (2002), Ngai
and Tenreyro (2009) among others.
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key results in the paper6.
Assumption 1. The density function F 0 (v) is strictly positive whereas the survival func-
tion 1  F is log-concave, that is F 02 (v) + F 00 (v) [1  F (v)] > 0; 8v:
It is assumed that the realization of v is the buyers private information and unob-
servable to the seller. The seller only knows F () and posts a take-it-or-leave-it price
p for the house, with no subsequent bargaining. If agents trade then the seller obtains
payo¤ p; the buyer obtains v   p, both agents leave the market and are replaced by a
buyer and a relaxed seller an assumption necessary to maintain stationarity. Since the
seller does not know the prospective buyers willingness to pay, he must ask the same
price regardless of the realization of v: The assumption of private information prevents
the seller from tailoring the price to each individual buyer; thus we avoid the well-known
Diamond Paradox (see Diamond (1971)).
A seller enters the market in a relaxed state, though, eventually as he is unable to sell,
he may be hit by a shock that arrives at an exogenous Poisson rate  > 0 and become
stressed. Buyers and relaxed sellers discount the future with  > 0 whereas stressed sellers
are more impatient with a discount factor  > . Sellers do not exit the market until they
sell, and a stressed seller remains stressed. The fraction of stressed sellers in the steady
state is endogenous and denoted by :
In what follows we focus on a symmetric steady state equilibrium with pure strategies
where identical agents follow the same strategy. In particular relaxed and stressed sellers
post pr and ps, whereas buyers, after meeting seller j = r; s and inspecting the house,
purchase if their private valuation v exceeds and endogenous threshold vj : We start by
analyzing the buyers problem.
6Log-concavity of the survival function is equivalent to the ratio of the density to the survival being
monotone increasing. This is a common assumption in models with private information. Uniform, Normal,
Cauchy and many other distributions satisfy this property. See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for more
details.
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2.2 The Buyers Problem
The problem of a representative buyer has a recursive formulation. We use a dynamic
programming approach letting 
 denote the value of search to a buyer. In a symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium the distribution of list prices p = (pr ; ps) is degenerate. Clearly

 is a function of p however we omit the argument when understood. We have

 = 
R 1
0 max [v   ps   
; 0] dF (v) +  (1  )
R 1
0 max [v   pr   
; 0] dF (v) :
A quick interpretation is this. With probability  a buyer meets a stressed seller
who asks for ps and upon inspecting the house the buyer realizes his valuation v 2 [0; 1] :
As long as the consumer surplus v   ps  
 is positive the buyer purchases, otherwise he
walks away. The second part of the expression is about a possible meeting with a relaxed
seller and can be interpreted similarly.
For any given price pj we conjecture an associated reservation value, or minimum
willingness to pay, vj := pj+
 such that the customer purchases only if v  vj : Obviously
not all meetings result in trade; for trade to occur the house must turn out to be a good
match for the buyer, which happens with probability 1 F (vj). We interpret a rise in vj
as buyers becoming more selective.
Notice that there are two types of trading frictions in the model. The rst is locating
a vacant house and the second is whether the house, once found, is a good match. The
fact that some meetings do not result in trade is in line with the empirical observation by
Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004). Analyzing transaction histories of residential properties
sold in England between 1995 and 1998 they nd that about a third of all matches resolve
with no agreement. This observation is in clear contradiction with most of the existing
theoretical models of the housing market, e.g. Arnold (1999), Krainer (2001), Yavas and
Yang (1995). Based on complete information, these models imply that all matches result
in a sale. Our model, on the contrary, captures this salient feature of the housing market
in a natural way by assuming private information.
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Inserting the reservation values into 
 we have

= 

R 1
vs
(v   vs) dF (v) + (1 )
R 1
vr
(v   vr) dF (v)
= 

R 1
vs
[1  F (v)] dv + (1 )
R 1
vr
[1  F (v)] dv; (1)
where in the second step we use integration by parts. Notice that
R 1
vj
[1  F (v)] dv is
the expected surplus to the buyer from a possible meeting with seller j and 
 simply
is a summation of these surpluses adjusted with appropriate meeting probabilities and
discounting.
The steady state fraction of stressed sellers, denoted by ; is endogenous and can be
obtained by equating the inow into the pool of stressed sellers (1  ) to the outow
 [1  F (vs)] : We have
 =

+  [1  F (vs)] 2 (0; 1) : (2)
Notice that vs > 0; i.e., buyers can squeeze the outow and increase  by becoming more
selective when trading with stressed sellers: This plays a strategic role in the pricing and
purchasing decisions of the agents (see Proposition 6).
Using (1) we can obtain the indi¤erence curves Ir and Is that trace combinations of
prices pj and reserve values vj leaving a buyer indi¤erent between buying and searching:
pj = vj   
R 1
vs
[1  F (v)] dv   (1 )
R 1
vr
[1  F (v)] dv := Ij (3)
Lemma 1 Indi¤erence curves Ir and Is slope upwards in vr and vs; i.e., @Ir@vr > 0 and
@Is
@vs
> 0:
All proofs are in the appendix.
ABOUT HERE
Figure 1a, 1b O¤er and Indi¤erence Curves7
7We set vs = 0:79 in panel a and vr = 0:82 in panel b, which are equilibrium reserve valuations for the
baseline parameters (see section 3).
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Figure 1 illustrates the Lemma for  = 1;  = 0:5;  = 0:05;  = 0:2 and the uniform
distribution F (v) = v, which are the baseline parameters that we use in subsequent
gures. In panel a imagine a horizontal line drawn at some price pr corresponding to the
threshold valuation vr: A buyer purchases only if the realized v happens to exceed vr; i.e.,
the distance 1  vr is the probability of trade. The Lemma establishes that the higher pr
the higher the associated vr and therefore the smaller the chance of a trade. Clearly a
seller can manipulate the acceptability of his house by adjusting the list price. From the
sellers point of view a price cut means a quicker sale albeit a revenue loss; hence he must
strike a balance between these two e¤ects, which we study next.
2.3 The Sellers Problem
Each seller advertises a take-it-or-leave-it price taking as given market prices and buyers
search decision. The value functions are given by
s= [1  F (vs)]max (ps  s; 0)
r = [1  F (vr)]max (pr  r; 0) +  (s  r) :
A quick interpretation is this. A stressed seller who lists ps meets a buyer with probability
, who purchases with probability 1  F (vs). The seller agrees to trade only if the price
exceeds his continued value of search i.e. if ps s  0. The second line is similar except
that a relaxed seller may become desperate with probability :
A stressed seller solves maxps s subject to the constraint vs = ps + 
 taking 
 as
given8. Conjecturing ps  s and inserting the constraint into the value function we
obtain
s =
 [1  F (ps +
)]
 +  [1  F (ps +
)]
ps:
The expression in front of ps is the probability of selling adjusted with the discount factor;
call it m (ps) and note that m0 < 0. From the sellers perspective raising ps brings in a
8From the sellers point of view, cutting ps directly improves the buyers willingness to trade, but the
seller fails to take into account how a drop in ps changes the equilibrium prices and the buyers value of
search. This large market approach is used in directed search models as well, e.g. see Camera and Selcuk
(2009).
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larger revenue (intensive margin), but lowers the chance of a sale (extensive margin).9
A relaxed sellers problem is similar: maxpr r subject to vr = pr + 
. Conjecturing
pr  r and inserting the constraint, the objective function becomes
r =
 [1  F (pr +
)] pr + s
 + +  [1  F (pr +
)] :
These maximization problems are standard; hence the algebra is relegated to the appendix.
The following summarizes the results.
Lemma 2 Price posting functions for relaxed and stressed sellers are
pr =
1 F (vr)
F 0(vr) +
[1 F (vr)]2
(+)F 0(vr) +
[1 F (vs)]2
(+)F 0(vs)
; (4)
ps=
1 F (vs)
F 0(vs) +


[1 F (vs)]2
F 0(vs) :
(5)
Furthermore @ps@vs <
@pr
@vs
< 0 and @pr@vr <
@ps
@vr
= 0:
Expressions (4) and (5) are prot maximizing prices (which are labeled as o¤er curves
Or and Os in Figure 1) that relaxed and stressed sellers ought to post given vr and vs. To
see why @pr@vr < 0 notice that for low values of vr the aforementioned intensive margin e¤ect
dominates the extensive margin. Put simply, buyers are not too selective and therefore
sellers can a¤ord to post high. However as vr rises the extensive margin starts to grow
hence pr falls. Using a similar argument one can explain why
@ps
@vs
< 0: More importantly
a relaxed seller can become stressed one day; hence @pr@vs < 0: Notice, however, this is an
indirect e¤ect. Indeed @ps@vs <
@pr
@vs
; i.e., relaxed sellers are less sensitive to a change in vs
than stressed sellers. Finally @ps@vr = 0 since a stressed seller never becomes relaxed again.
Simultaneous intersections of the o¤er and indi¤erence curves in Figure 1a and 1b
determine the equilibrium reserve valuations and list prices, which we discuss next.
3 Equilibrium: Existence and Characterization
Denition 3 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies is characterized by
pairs v = (vr ; vs) and p = (pr ; ps) that satisfy (3), (4) and (5).
9 It is worth noting that, although the seller can manipulate the probability of trade by adjusting the
list price, search is undirected, that is the arrival rate  does not depend on the list price. Buyers decide
whether to purchase or not after randomly meeting the seller.
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The fraction of stressed sellers , which is given by (2) and also implicitly part of the
equilibrium, can easily be recovered from the above conditions.
In this section we rst prove existence of a unique equilibrium then we discuss com-
parative statics. To start, dene the di¤erence functions
j (vr; vs) := pj   vj +
 = 0 (6)
and their locuses
lj (vr) := fvs 2 [0; 1]jj (vr; vs) = 0g :
Clearly equilibrium v and p must satisfy (6). The next Lemma, which plays a key role
in proving Theorem 5, establishes that lr and ls look as in Figure 2.
Lemma 4 Equations in (6) dene lr and ls as implicit and strictly decreasing functions
of vr with dlrdvr <
dls
dvr
< 0: Furthermore there exists some 0 < vs < vs < 1 and vr 2 (0; 1)
such that ls (0) = vs, ls (1) = vs and lr (vr) = 1: Last either there exists some vr 2 (vr; 1)
such that lr (vr) = 0 as in Figure 2a or there exists some vs 2 (0; vs) such that lr (1) = vs
as in Figure 2b.
ABOUT HERE
Figure 2a, 2b Locuses
Figure 2, drawn for the uniform distribution and the parameter values in the left
corners, is an illustration of the Lemma. The fact that lr is steeper than ls and the specic
locations of the boundaries guarantee a unique intersection: The following Theorem states
the main existence result. The proof involves showing lr and ls intersect once at some
interior v and then checking incentive compatibility for sellers.
Theorem 5 There exists a unique (pooling) equilibrium characterized by some interior
v and p: Furthermore vr > vs and pr > ps:
It is worth noting that the equilibrium exists for all parameter values and any cdf
satisfying Assumption 1. Furthermore it is a pooling equilibrium in that both types of
sellers participate by posting interior prices and buyers purchase from both types of sellers
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More importantly, in equilibrium motivated sellers advertise lower prices and sell faster
than regular sellers. After becoming depressed a seller starts to discount the future more
heavily which induces him to o¤er a price cut to sell more quickly. Indeed recalling that
1 F (v) is the probability of trade, vr > vs implies that buyers are more likely to purchase
when dealing with a motivated seller.
This result is empirically plausible. Glower et al. (1998) survey sellers in Columbus
Ohio area to obtain information on their motivation by asking whether they have a planned
date to move out or accepted a job o¤er elsewhere or bought another house etc., and
document that motivated sellers accept lower prices and sell more quickly. Merlo and
Ortalo-Magné (2004), based on home sale transaction data from England, nd that 65%
of sellers do not change their list price, 26% reduce only once, and 9% reduce twice or
more. Based on the same data set, Merlo et al. (2008) obtain the individual list price
trajectories, which are either at or piecewise at with typically one discontinuous jump-
down at the time of the price reduction (see Figure 2.1 therein). We interpret these price
drops as sellers becoming desperate and o¤ering discounts to sell as quickly as possible.
Price trajectories follow from Theorem 5: if the seller stays relaxed until he sells then the
trajectory of the list price is at at pr : Otherwise it is piecewise at with a drop from pr
to ps at the date the seller is hit by the shock.10
The next proposition summarizes how vand p respond to changes in  and .
Proposition 6 In equilibrium
dpj
d < 0;
dvj
d > 0,
dpj
d
< 0;
dvj
d
< 0:
The shock may arrive more often, for instance, during a recession or nancial crisis
where sellers are more likely to loose their jobs or experience other nancial di¢ culties.
Clearly as  rises more sellers are hit by the shock and are forced to o¤er price discounts.
In addition to this immediate e¤ect the Proposition indicates two subsequent e¤ects. First,
even existing relaxed and stressed sellers lower their prices,
dpj
d < 0; which is a spillover
e¤ect of the rising number of forced sales. Second, buyers exhibit a vulture behavior:
even though prices decrease, buyers become more selective and search longer for better
10 In our model the shock hits only once, hence the drop occurs only once.
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deals, that is
dvj
d > 0. To see why, notice that sellersvalue of search declines with : a
relaxed seller is more fearful of becoming depressed while a stressed seller faces a sti¤er
competition because of the rising  (recall that  > 0); hence prices drop. Buyersvalue
of search, on the other hand, rises with : because there are so many distressed sales a
buyers can a¤ord to become more selective, hence vj rises.
Campbell et al. (2009) provide some empirical evidence for the aforementioned spillover
e¤ect. Using a comprehensive data set on individual house transactions in Massachusetts
they study the spillover e¤ects of foreclosures on the prices of nearby houses and nd that
the rising foreclosures signicantly lower the price at which a house can be sold within a
0.25 mile neighborhood.
If the shock becomes more severe, that is if  rises then the value of search for both
types of sellers decreases; hence prices drop. Furthermore recall that  = 0. From a
buyers perspective, put simply, the fraction of deals stays the same but the deals get
sweeter because of the lower prices. Consequently buyers lower their threshold valuations
to catch these deals. The nal result is that both types of sellers reduce their prices and
sell faster, i.e.
dpj
d
< 0 and
dvj
d
< 0: Furthermore, simulations suggest that as  !  we
have ps ! pr and vs ! vr and the gaps widen as  grows. If the shock is mild (  )
then there is not much di¤erence between what relaxed and stressed sellers post. However
as the shock starts to bite (  ), distressed sellers o¤er sizeable price discounts and sell
considerably faster.
Since the parameters  and  are well understood in random search models we omit
their discussion.11. However it is worth noting that
dvj
d > 0, that is if it gets easier to
meet sellers (due to better technology, internet etc.) then buyers become more selective
and search longer. Consequently trade not necessarily speeds up.
11Following the steps outlined in the proof of Proposition 6, one can show that
dvj
d
> 0;
dpj
d
< 0;
dvj
d
< 0 and
dpj
d
> 0:
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4 Time to Sale
Consider a seller who enters the market at time 0 (wlog). The probability that he remains
relaxed without a sale until time t is given by
r (t) = e (+r)t; (7)
where j := 
h
1  F

vj
i
: Similarly the probability that he becomes stressed at some
time x  t while the house is still unsold at t equals
s (t) =
Z t
0
e xe rxe s(t x)dx: (8)
Notice that e x is the density (exponential pdf) of becoming stressed over [0; x] ; e rx
is the probability of no sale while the seller was relaxed and e s(t x) is the probability
of no sale between x and t during which he was stressed. Using these expressions we can
obtain the density of the time-to-sale and the expected time on the market (TOM)
Proposition 7 The density of the time on the market is given by
 =
se
 st   (s   r) (+ r) e (+r)t
  s + r ; (9)
which is hump shaped if  >
[1 F (vr )]2
F (vr ) F (vs ) and monotone decreasing otherwise. Furthermore
TOM =
+ s
s (+ r)
:
To build intuition we illustrate  under three scenarios.  = 1;  = 0:2; the benchmark;
 = 1;  = 1; a more severe shock;  = 0:1;  = 0:2; a less frequent shock. First notice that
the density is skewed to the right and can be hump shaped if the ratio = is su¢ ciently
large, i.e., if buyers are scarce and the shock is frequent. Clearly given Poisson arrivals, it
is not surprising to see that  resembles an exponential pdf, which is heavily right-skewed.
The shape of  is indeed realistic. Merlo et al. (2008), based on house sale transaction
data from England, obtain the empirical distribution of times to sale, which is clearly right
skewed and hump-shaped with a mean 10.27 weeks and median of 6 weeks (see gure 2.3
therein).
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Figure 3a, 3b12
Remark. An increase in  or  results in a slimmer tail and a shorter expected time on
the market.
Recall that if  increases then trade speeds up (Proposition 6), hence the likelihood of
a long duration falls (slimmer tail). Indeed in Figure 3a the pdf drawn for  = 1;  = 1
has a slimmer tail than the one drawn for  = 1;  = 0:2. The expected time on the
market drops as well. One can verify that
dTOM
d
=
@TOM
@vr
dvr
d
+
@TOM
@vs
dvs
d
< 0
since @TOM@vj
> 0 and
dvj
d
< 0.
The e¤ect of  is less obvious. On the one hand if  rises then more seller become
desperate and since desperate sellers sell faster than relaxed sellers. TOM should drop.
On the other hand because of the rising  buyers become more selective (Proposition 6),
hence TOM should rise. Analytically it is di¢ cult to sign dTOMd but simulations suggest
that the former e¤ect is dominant, that is TOM falls as the shock arrives more frequently.
Indeed, in Figure 3a the pdf drawn for  = 1;  = 0:2 has a slimmer tail than the one
drawn for  = 0:1;  = 0:2:
4.1 Expected Sale Price
Consider sales completed with a duration t: The fraction of distressed sales equals to
g (t) =
s (t)
r (t) + s (t)
:
One can easily verify that g rises in t (see the proof of Proposition 8), i.e., the longer the
duration, the more likely the sellers are to be desperate. An immediate corollary is that
the expected sale price falls with the duration since desperate sellers sell at a discount.
To see this more precisely dene the expected sale price p (t) = gps + (1  g) pr and the
variance 2 (t) = g (ps   p)2 + (1  g) (pr   p)2.
12We x F (v) = v1=3;  = 1; and  = 0:05.
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Proposition 8 p (t) is monotone decreasing and 2 (t) is hump-shaped in t:
Figure 3b illustrates p (left scale) and  (right scale) for the benchmark parameters.
Indeed if a house is sold soon after it was advertised then most likely it is a relaxed sale,
that is limt!0 p (t) ! pr : However the longer it stays on the market, the more likely the
seller is to become desperate and in the limit p (t)! ps:
The fact that the expected sale price falls with the duration is empirically documented,
e.g. see Yavas and Yang (1995), Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) among others. The
continuously downward slope in p may be somewhat misleading and create an illusion
that the list price continuously falls with the duration. We emphasize that an individual
list price trajectory is piecewise at with a discontinuous drop from pr to ps at the time
the seller is hit by the shock. It is the expected price that falls monotonically; the actual
price is either pr or ps: The shape of the standard deviation is also very intuitive. For
very short or very long durations the sale is either relaxed or stressed, respectively, with a
high probability. Only for intermediate values there is ambiguity; hence the hump shape.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model of the housing market where buyersvaluations are private
information and sellers are heterogenous in terms of their urgency to sell. The model has
a number of interesting implications. Once desperate, a seller o¤ers a price discount and
consequently sells more quickly. In addition, as the number of distressed sales rises, even
relaxed sellers are forced to lower their prices. To make things worse for sellers, buyers
delay purchasing and search longer for better deals. Finally we obtain the distribution of
the time on the market and the expected sale prices analytically. Most of our results are
consistent with the empirical literature on the housing market.
Some natural extensions suggest themselves. For instance, for the sake of tractability
we deliberately ignored bargaining; whereas in reality a house is hardly sold without
bargaining. It would be interesting to consider, say, two rounds of negotiations à la
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) between the potential buyer and the seller. This opens up
the possibility of a lowballo¤er, which, if rejected is followed by a higher o¤er. Indeed,
15
this is what Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) observe empirically.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Since Ij = vj  
; it su¢ ces to show @
@vj < 0 for j = r; s: To start,
note that
@

@vr
=  (1 ) [1  F (vr)] ;
which clearly is negative: Now consider
@

@vs
= 
0

R vr
vs
[1  F (v)] dv    [1  F (vs)] ; (10)
where
0 = @@vs =
F 0(vs)
+[1 F (vs)] > 0:
To show @
@vs < 0 it su¢ ces to demonstrate
 (vs) :=
R 1
vs
[1  F (v)] dv    1 F (vs)F 0(vs)  
[1 F (vs)]2
F 0(vs) < 0:
Omitting the argument and di¤erentiating with respect to vs we have
0 = F
02+F 00(1 F )
F 02

 + 1  F

which is positive under Assumption 1: Since  increases in vs and  (1) = 0; it follows that
 (vs) < 0, 8vs 2 [0; 1): 
Proof of Lemma 2. Start by analyzing the stressed sellers problem. Rearranging
s we have
s =


[1  F (ps +
)] (ps  s) : (11)
Di¤erentiating s with respect to ps yields (omit the argument)
0s =   (ps  s)F 0 +


(1 0s) (1  F ) :
Notice that 
0 = 0 since sellers take 
 as given. The rst-order condition is given by
0s = 0, ps  s = 1 F (vs)F 0(vs) : (12)
To check for the second order condition note that
  00s = (ps  s)F 00 + 2 (1 s)F 0 + (1  F )00s :
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Inserting 0s = 0 and using (12) we obtain sign (00s) =  sign
 
F 00 (1  F ) + 2F 02 ; which
clearly is negative under Assumption 1.
To recover the list price ps rst insert (12) into (11) to get s = 
[1 F (vs)]2
F 0(vs) : Inserting
this into (12) yields the o¤er curve for stressed sellers, given by (5).
The problem of a relaxed seller is similar. Rearrange r to obtain
r =


[1  F (vr)] (vr   
 r) + 

[s  r] : (13)
Di¤erentiate r with respect to pr, imposing 
0 = 0s = 0 since they are taken as given,
to obtain the rst-order condition
0r = 0, pr  r = 1 F (vr)F 0 (vr) : (14)
It is easy to verify that under Assumption 1 we have 00r < 0 (the proof is very similar to
above). To obtain pr rst use (13), (14) and the expression for s from above to get
r =
[1 F (vr)]2
(+)F 0(vr) +
[1 F (vs)]2
(+)F 0(vs)
:
Inserting this into (14) provides the o¤er curve of a relaxed seller given by (4).
To show the second part of the Lemma di¤erentiate (4) and (5) to get
@pr
@vr
=  F 02r +F 00r (1 Fr)
F 022
  (1 Fr)(+)
h
2F 02r +F 00r (1 Fr)
F 02r
i
< 0; (15)
@pr
@vs
=  (1 Fs)
(+)
h
2F 02s +F 00s (1 Fs)
F 02s
i
< 0 ; @ps
@vr
= 0; (16)
@ps
@vs
=  F 02s +F 00s (1 Fs)
F 02s
  (1 Fs)

h
2F 02s +F 00s (1 Fs)
F 02s
i
< 0; (17)
where Fj := F (vj). Given Assumption 1,
@pr
@vr
; @pr@vs and
@ps
@vs
are obviously negative. @ps@vs
< @pr@vs is also obvious after comparing (16) and (17) term by term.
Proof of Lemma 4. We will rst demonstrate that dlrdvr <
dls
dvr
and then we will focus
on the existence of boundaries vj ; vj : To start, recall that
r (vr; vs) = pr   vr +
 and s (vr; vs) = ps   vs +
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where 
; pr; and ps are respectively given by (1), (4) and (5). Notice that
@r
@vr
= @pr@vr   1 + @
@vr < @s@vr =
@ps
@vr
+ @
@vr < 0;
(18)
@s
@vs
= @ps@vs   1 + @
@vs < @r@vs =
@pr
@vs
+ @
@vs < 0:
(19)
These inequalities follow from the facts that @
@vj < 0,
@ps
@vs
< @pr@vs < 0 and
@pr
@vr
< @ps@vr = 0
(see Lemma 1 and Lemma 2). Therefore j (vr; vs) = 0 denes vs = lj (vr) as an implicit
function of vr (Implicit Function Theorem) with
dlj
dvr
=  @j=@vr@j=@vs < 0 :
Since @r@vr <
@s
@vr
< 0 and @s@vs <
@r
@vs
< 0 it is obvious that dlrdvr <
dls
dvr
< 0:
Boundaries. Start by evaluatings (vr; vs) at end points. It is straightforward to show
that s (0; 0) > s (1; 0) > 0 and s (0; 1) = s (1; 1) =  1 < 0: Since s (1; 0) > 0 and
s (1; 1) < 0 and s decreases in vs the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees existence
of some vs 2 (0; 1) such that s (1; vs) = 0; i.e., ls (1) = vs. Similarly s (0; 0) > 0 and
s (0; 1) < 0 implies existence of some vs 2 (0; 1) such that s (0; vs) = 0, i.e., ls (0) = vs.
Note that ls (1) < ls (0) and since ls decreases in vr clearly vs < vs:
Now evaluate r (vr; vs) at end points. We have r (0; 0) > r (0; 1) > 0 and
r (1; 1) =  1 < 0. However the expression
r (1; 0) =

(+)F 0(0)
  1 + 
R 1
0 [1  F (v)] dv
can be positive or negative. To show existence of vr 2 (0; 1) notice that r (0; 1) > 0 and
r (1; 1) < 0 and since r decreases in vr the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees
existence of some vr 2 (0; 1) such that r (vr; 1) = 0 which is equivalent to lr (vr) = 1:
Existence of vr or vs hinges on the sign of r (1; 0) as we study below.
Suppose r (1; 0) < 0 : Since r (0; 0) > 0 there exists some vr 2 (0; 1) such that
r (vr; 0) = 0 or equivalently lr (vr) = 0; and since lr is a decreasing function of vr we
have vr < vr:
Suppose r (1; 0) > 0 : First we will show that r (1; vs) < 0: Notice that
s (1; vs) r (1; vs) = 1 F (vs)F 0(vs) +

(+)
[1 F (vs)]2
F 0(vs)
+ 1  vs > 0;
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and since s (1; vs) = 0 it is clear that r (1; vs) < 0: Now since r (1; 0) > 0 there exists
some v
s
2 (0; vs) such that r

1; v
s

= 0 or equivalently lr (1) = vs:
Proof of Theorem 5. First we will demonstrate lr and ls intersect once in the unit
interval. Dene z := lr   ls and notice that it decreases in vr since dzdvr = dlrdvr   dlsdvr < 0
(Lemma 4). Furthermore it is easy to verify z (vr) > 0 since and z (1) < 0: Indeed
z (vr) = lr (vr)   ls (vr) = 1   ls (vr) > 0 since ls (vr) < ls (0) = vs < 1 and similarly
z (1) = lr (1) ls (1) = lr (1) vs < 0 since lr (1) is either negative or equals vs both of which
are smaller than vs (see the proof of Lemma 4): Consequently the Intermediate Value
Theorem guarantees existence of a unique vr 2 (vr; 1) such that lr (vr ) = ls (vr ) = vs :
Now we will show vr > vs and pr > ps: Note that (vr ; vs) satises r (vr ; vs)  
s (v

r ; v

s) = 0, where
@(r s)
@vr
= @pr@vr   1 
@ps
@vr
< 0
because @pr@vr < 0 and
@ps
@vr
= 0 (see (15) and (16)). As a contradiction suppose vr = vs = v
and notice that
r (v; v) s (v; v) = ( )(+)
[1 F (v)]2
F 0(v) > 0:
It follows that if r (vr ; vs)   s (vr ; vs) = 0 then vr > vs : Furthermore pr > ps is
immediate since in equilibrium pr   ps = vr   vs > 0. For future reference, plugging in
for pr and ps we have
pr   ps = 1 F (v

r )
F 0(vr )
  1 F (vs )F 0(vs ) +

+
h
[1 F (vr )]2
F 0(vr )
  

[1 F (vs )]2
F 0(vs )
i
> 0: (20)
Finally we check incentive compatibility for the sellers. A type j seller sells if pj > j : It is
obvious from (12) and (14) that pj  j =
h
1  F

vj
i
=F 0

vj

> 0; since vj 2 (0; 1) :
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that vr and vs satisfyr (vr ; vs) = 0 ands (vr ; vs) =
0 simultaneously. Omit the superscript and note that (General Implicit Function Theo-
rem) dvjdx =
detBj(x)
detA for any x = ;  and j = r; s where
Br (x) =
24 @r@x @r@vs
 @s@x @s@vs
35 ; Bs (x) =
24 @r@vr  @r@x
@s
@vr
 @s@x
35 ; A =
24 @r@vr @r@vs
@s
@vr
@s
@vs
35 :
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Note that detA = @r@vr
@s
@vs
  @s@vr @r@vs > 0 since @r@vr < @s@vr < 0 and @s@vs < @r@vs < 0 (see
(18) and (19)). It follows that sign

@vj
@x

= sign (detBj (x)) :
Partial Derivatives. Realizing @j@x =
@pj
@x +
@

@x , we need the partial derivatives of 
; pr;
and ps with respect to x = ; : Starting with (1) it is easy to verify that
@

@
= 0 and @
@ =
2[1 Fs]
2
R vr
vs
[1  F (v)] dv > 0:
Notice that 
 is positive since vr > vs (Theorem 5). Now di¤erentiate (4) and (5) to get
@ps
@
=   

2
[1 F (vs)]2
F 0(vs) < 0,
@pr
@
= (+)
@ps
@
< 0
@ps
@ = 0;
@pr
@ =   (+)2
h
(1 Fr)2
F 0r
  

(1 Fs)2
F 0s
i
< 0.
The signs of the rst three expressions are obvious whereas @pr@ is negative if
(1 Fr)2
F 0r
  

(1 Fs)2
F 0s
> 0: (21)
To show that (21) holds, focus on (20) and note that 1 F (v)F 0(v) decreases in v; thus the term
1 Fr
F 0r
  1 FsF 0s is negative, since v

r > v

s . Since (20) is positive, (21) must be also positive.
Reserve Values. Now we analyze sign (detBj (x)) for x = ;  and j = r; s.
Since @

@
= 0 we have
detBs
 


= @s@vr
@pr
@
  @r@vr
@ps
@
:
Furthermore since @ps
@
< @pr
@
< 0 and @r@vr <
@s
@vr
< 0 (see (18)) it follows that detBs
 


<
0; hence dvs
d
< 0:
Because @ps@ = 0 we have
detBs () =
@s
@vr
@pr
@ +
@

@
h
@s
@vr
  @r@vr
i
:
Since @pr@ < 0;
@

@ > 0 and
@r
@vr
< @s@vr < 0 it follows that detBs () is positive and
therefore dvsd > 0:
Recalling @pr
@
= +
@ps
@
< 0 and @

@
= 0 it is easy to verify that
detBr
 


= @ps
@
h
@pr
@vs
  + @ps@vs + + @
@vs +

+
i
:
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Using (17), (16), (10) and (2) one can show that the expression inside the square brackets
equals to

+
F 02s +F 00s (1 Fs)
F 02s
+ 
0
+
R vr
vs
[1  F (v)] dv + + > 0:
Note that the rst term is positive under Assumption 1 and the second term is positive
since 0 > 0 (see the proof of Lemma 1) and vr > vs : It follows that detBr
 


< 0, hence
dvr
d
< 0:
Recalling @ps@ = 0 we obtain
detBr () =
@

@
h
@r
@vs
  @s@vs
i
+ @s@vs
@pr
@
:
The rst term is positive since @s@vs <
@r
@vs
< 0 (see (19)) and @
@ > 0: The second term is
also positive since @s@vs < 0 and
@pr
@ < 0. It follows that detBr () > 0; thus
dvr
d > 0:
Prices. Totally di¤erentiating pj with respect to  one obtains
dpj
d =
@pj
@ +
@pj
@vr
dvr
d +
@pj
@vs
dvs
d :
Recall that @pr@ <
@ps
@ = 0,
dpj
dvr
 0; dpjdvs < 0 and
dvj
d > 0; hence
dpj
d < 0:
To show dpj
d
< 0; recall that pj = vj  
 in equilibrium. Di¤erentiation with respect to 
yields
dpj
d
=
dvj
d
  @
@vr dvrd  
@

@vs
dvs
d
;
which is negative since dvj
d
< 0 and @
@vj < 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Evaluating the integral in (8) we have
s (t) = e
 st r(t)
 s+r :
The expected time on the market TOM equals to
R1
0 (r + s) dt whereas the density func-
tion  is given by  d(r+s)dt : Basic algebra reveals that TOM and  are given by the
expressions on display in Proposition 7. It is easy to verify that  is positive and thatR1
0 dt =   [r (t) + s (t)] j10 = 1: To analyze the shape of  note that
0 =  
2
se
 st+(s r)(+r)2e (+r)t
 s+r ;
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where s r =  [F (vr )  F (vs)] > 0 since vr > vs : Notice that the denominator could
be either positive or negative. It follows that
If  > s   r then 0 (t) > 0, (s r)(+r)
2
2s
> e(+r s)t;
If  < s   r then 0 (t) > 0, (s r)(+r)
2
2s
< e(+r s)t:
First note that limt!1 0 < 0; i.e.,  is monotone decreasing for t large. Now evaluate
limt!0 : Note that in the rst line the exponential term is minimum when t = 0 whereas in
the second line it is maximum when t = 0. Based on this observation one can demonstrate
that 0 (0) > 0 if  >
[1 F (vr )]2
F (vr ) F (vs ) : Clearly if 
0 (0) > 0 then  rst rises and then falls
(hump-shape). Otherwise if 0 (0) < 0 it falls monotonically.
Proof of Proposition 8. Notice that dp(t)dt =  dg(t)dt (pr   ps) : One can verify that
dg(t)
dt / e (s+r+) > 0:
It follows that p0 < 0 since pr > ps: Finally note that
d2
dt = (p

r   ps) [g0 (2p  pr   ps) + 2gp0] :
Clearly d
2
dt shares the sign of the expression in the square brackets, since p

r > p

s. One
can verify that limt!0 g (t) = 0 and limt!1 g (t) = 1 so that limt!0 p (t) = pr and
limt!1 p (t) = ps. It follows that
d2
dt is positive for t small and negative for t large
because g0 > 0 and p0 < 0. In other words 2 rst rises and subsequently falls with t: 
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